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THE MIND IN THE MAJOR AMERICAN 
LAW SCHOOL 
Lee C. Bollinger* 
Legal scholarship is significantly, even qualitatively, different from 
what it was some two or three decades ago. As with any major change 
in intellectual thought, this one is composed of several strands. The 
inclusion in the legal academic community of women and minorities 
has produced, not surprisingly, a distinctive and at times quite critical 
body of thought and writing. The emergence of the school of thought 
known as critical legal studies has renewed and extended the legal re-
alist critique of law of the first half of the century. But more than 
anything else it is the interdisciplinary movement in legal thought, 
which began in the late 1960s and continues with unabated force to 
this day, that has transformed the character of modem thinking about 
law. Virtually every field of human knowledge is being mined for 
what it can contribute to our understanding of the processes of law 
and of legal issues. 
For Judge Edwards these intellectual developments have adversely 
affected the modem American law school, especially the "elite" 
among them. He argues, in strong terms, 1 that within these institu-
tions there is an unfortunate emphasis on pursuing abstract "theory" 
at the expense of engaging in hard-headed, lawyerly analysis of legal 
doctrine. The vantage point from which he issues this indictment is 
primarily that of a judge: judges, he says, are getting less and less help 
from legal scholarship as they try to decide the cases before them. 
While Judge Edwards disclaims any desire to rid law schools entirely 
of "theory," he makes no bones about his view that there is "too 
much" of it and that a good deal of it is of poor quality as theory. He 
• Dean and Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.S. 1968, University of 
Oregon; J.D. 1971, Columbia. - Ed. I am grateful to Richard Pildes, Yale Kamisar, Richard 
Lempert, Jeff Lehman, and my son, Lee Bollinger Jr., for their helpful comments on earlier 
drafts of this essay. 
1. Judge Edwards claims that "many law schools - especially the so-called 'elite' ones -
have abandoned their proper place, by emphasizing abstract theory at the expense of practical 
scholarship and pedagogy." Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Educa-
tion and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34, 34 (1992). He says that "the schools are 
moving toward pure theory," id., and that the "reality" is that "many 'elite' law faculties in the 
United States now have significant contingents of 'impractical' scholars, who are 'disdainful of 
the practice of law.' " Id. at 35. "The proponents of the various 'law and' movements," Judge 
Edwards says at one point, "generally disdain doctrinal analysis." Id. at 36. 
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sees an excess of ambition over talent and suggests that law professors 
would be better off sticking to what they do best - or, in any event, 
better - which presumably is to analyze cases, organize fields of law, 
and discover and criticize existing legal principles. 
All this is bad enough, Judge Edwards laments, but compounding 
this excessive theorizing in law schools is an attitude among would-be 
"theorists" of disdain, even contempt, for those who plow the fields of 
doctrine. This supposed attitude carries over into the classroom, and 
with no small consequences. It is said to cause our graduates to feel 
alienated from their professional lives; this alienation is in turn pro-
ducing an increasingly unprofessional and unethical bar. 
I think this diagnosis of a highly contagious and debilitating dis-
ease of "theory" in our major law schools, and of its supposed effects, 
is seriously overdrawn - even to the point of being a fundamental 
mischaracterizatfon - and is discouragingly unappreciative of the de-
gree to which law schools have over the years become intellectually 
invigorated - in a professional sense - by the expansion of knowl-
edge and arguments now regarded as relevant to thinking about law. 
There are several problematic layers in Judge Edwards' critique, but 
the first is its offer of a basically flawed image of what law schools are 
really like these days. Reading Judge Edwards' article, one comes 
away with the impression that a majority of the faculty at these 
schools has turned its back on its professional identity and given up 
focusing on basic questions of law. This is simply not the case. 
One way to correct this misimpression is to take a quick glance at 
the monthly summary of publications contained in the Index To Legal 
Periodicals. Just a brief review of the titles listed there provides a so-
bering antidote to the natural but nonetheless mistaken tendency to 
fixate on what you do not like or on a few highly publicized incidents 
or publications, and then to assume that the rest of the world is just 
like that. The Index does not identify publications outside the realm 
of traditional legal fora, so it does not provide us with a clear picture 
of the potentially foregone opportunities for work on traditional legal 
subjects. But it still reveals a rather remarkable array of writing evi-
dently about "law" and doctrine, even by scholars from "elite" schools 
for the "elite" law reviews. 
The notion of a rampant turn within the legal academy towards 
theory, or away from scholarly - or professional - engagement with 
contemporary legal problems is also belied by a close examination of 
my own faculty, which is generally regarded - and quite properly so 
- as one of the centers of interdisciplinary legal research. Out of a 
productive tenured faculty of about forty professors, eight are authors 
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of major treatises; fifteen are authors of casebooks; at least twenty-five 
have published works about significant and practical legal issues 
within the last year or two; six - of whom only two are treatise au-
thors - are engaged in major law reform efforts; and at least eighteen 
- not including the last six - have been involved as consultants, ad-
visors, or active participants in some concrete legal issue in the last 
year. Yale Kamisar, the one member of the faculty who holds a uni-
versity professorship, the highest honor bestowed within the school, is 
the paradigm of the law professor concerned in his teaching and writ-
ing with careful analysis of legal issues. Thus, when you consider that 
the Michigan faculty has the usual complement of legal historians -
five, though a couple are part-time - and legal philosophers - two -
you realize that the image of the law school as a group of second-rate 
social theorists trying to imitate Habermas or Foucault is simply 
wrong. The overwhelming majority of the faculty think of themselves, 
and appropriately so, as professional legal scholars and teachers con-
cerned- with understanding major legal problems in their fields. 
Part of the problem with Judge Edwards' critique is the limited 
perspective from which he assays the nature of contemporary legal 
scholarship and service. If you look, as he does, primarily for law 
review articles that offer immediate help to judges, you are bound to 
underestimate the amount of very practical, relevant scholarship being 
produced today. Not only does a good deal of ·contemporary legal 
scholarship appear in forms other than the traditional law review arti-
cle, but much of it is directed at other decisionmakers besides judges. 
The propositions that imprisoning fathers who fail to pay child sup-
port deters delinquency, that lineups are less protective of defendants' 
rights than showups, that a Michigan legislative program for citizens 
to finance their children's higher education tuition costs is based on 
unsound legal and financial premises - all theses put forth by Michi-
gan faculty and all highly relevant to pressing social issues - may not 
be particularly helpful to the federal judge but certainly are to other 
decisionmakers. 
I should also say that the "what-helps-a-judge" angle also leads 
one to ignore or undervalue the degree to which those who advocate 
major, or radical, reform of law are engaged - professionally engaged 
-with legal issues. Judges are not revolutionaries, and they rarely go 
beyond making interstitial changes in the law. And, for that reason, 
they are not likely as a group to be especially receptive to, or to find 
especially helpful, scholarship that is sharply critical of existing legal 
norms. Hence, scholarly writings with a strong feminist, or critical 
race, or critical legal studies perspective, much of which is highly spe-
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cific about legal doctrine, are not likely to be welcomed by the judge 
laboring over an opinion. Here again, however, other decisionmakers 
might feel differently. 
I see this rather clearly in the First Amendment area. Some femi-
nist and some critical race scholars advocate significant changes in the 
existing First Amendment doctrine. They argue that the harms of 
speech are greater than previously supposed, that the slippery slope of 
new regulation is not as slippery as many think or is a risk worth 
bearing, and that the interpretation of the Constitution ought to be 
changed accordingly. I have noticed a tendency to try to discount 
such attacks on conventional thinking by labelling them as "aca-
demic" or "abstract," even when they are quite as specific and con-
crete as the arguments presented by those who think the status quo is 
just fine. 
Now, to return to where I began, all this is not to say that there 
have not been significant changes in the intellectual character of law 
schools. There certainly have been. The greatest has been the inter-
disciplinary movement - a term I use deliberately. This is an intellec-
tual shift so right, so compelling, as to be properly irreversible. Its 
origins lie in a simple realization, namely that a number of fields pos-
sess knowledge of direct relevance to assumptions underlying law. 
This is the same idea that led Lord Mansfield to seek the knowledge of 
merchants in creating contract law. Indeed, it may be said that law 
always speaks the language of other disciplines, and the only issue is 
whether, as with Monsieur Jourdaiu, that comes as a surprise. To re-
main ignorant of relevant information about legal principles is to risk 
not only making the law dumb but also making it an instrument of 
social harm and injustice.2 If it works well, and I believe in general it 
has, the interdisciplinary movement improves the professional mission 
of law schools. It makes scholarship more relevant, not less. 
There can be no question that the depth of intellectual sophistica-
tion in law schools today is significantly greater than it was just a 
couple of decades ago. There is a greater self-consciousness about law 
as a human activity. Concepts and ideas, that were unknown then, 
have been added to the standard working tools of legal scholarship 
and teaching. By comparison, scholarship from earlier eras now often 
seems formalistic, simplistic and even shallow. The audience about 
2. To pay tribute to Professor Edwards, this was the basis for his very compelling arguments 
about fashioning employment discrimination law in Race Discrimination in Employment: What 
Price Equality?, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 572. Only by understanding the historical and sociological 
realities of racial discrimination in employment, he argued, can we then "fairly appraise some of 
the current legal debates over appropriate remedies for job bias." Id. at 573. 
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law has also greatly expanded. Serious bookstores now have sections 
devoted to serious books about law. The special character of law - its 
blending of theory and practice - together with the new openness 
within the legal community to outside knowledge - has widened the 
number and the types of participants in debates about legal issues. It 
has also attracted some of the best people from other fields into the 
legal community - yielding valuable contributions even to analysis of 
doctrine. (The legal philosopher Don Regan on my faculty has pub-
lished both a leading book of philosophy and a two-hundred page, de-
finitive law review article on the Dormant Commerce Clause.) 
Students are also better educated. Principles of economics, theories of 
government and of finance, ideas about the nature of the human psy-
chology, and so on, are part of their vocabulary and within their con-
ceptual grasp. 
To be sure, there are problems or potential problems with the in-
terdisciplinary movement in legal tho~ght. First, there are certainly 
failures. Some of the scholarship born of the interdisciplinary or other 
movements is naive, even on occasion silly. Second, the question is, 
and must constantly be raised, whether law is merely absorbing 
wooden or simplistic versions of knowledge from the other disciplines. 
Third is a risk that the sense of law as a discrete human enterprise, 
having its own special character and definition as a discipline, will be 
diminished or lost. We should worry about law merely becoming ap-
plied economics or philosophy. Fourth, with the increase in interdisci-
plinary knowledge, there also come the problems of internal 
specialization within the legal community, producing the kind of babel 
of incomprehensible languages that so troublingly besets the modem 
university. Fifth, and finally, there is the basic question of the identity 
assumed by law professors: are. we in our intellectual and emotional 
hearts historians, philosophers, psychologists, literary critics first, or 
are we intellectual participants in the profession of law? 
All these risks I see as serious and worthy of attention, but I have 
to say I do not see them as presently so serious as to undermine the 
integrity of law schools as educational or .research centers for the pro-
fession. As for the scholarly flotsam that accompanies the new intel-
lectual movements, my own view is that this has to be kept in 
perspective. Almost any shift in thought of the dimensions we are 
talking about here is a collective affair, involving many people explor-
ing the same general territory. The less talented will always wish to 
follow in the footsteps of the gifted. There will always be intellectual 
hangers-on. They like and benefit from the association with those who 
have achieved great things, even if that association exists only in their 
2172 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:2167 
own minds. We possess, however, few effective means of separating 
the weak from the strong at the outset. More to the point, though, is 
the fact that exactly the same thing happens, now as well as in the 
past, with doctrinal scholarship. There have always been mediocre or 
poor doctrinal analysis and subjects that became disproportionately 
fashionable for awhile, and for precisely the same reasons that there is 
now a degree of poor "theory" scholarship. 
It also remains to be seen what contributions to general knowledge 
these movements will amass. On that the jury is still out. And it 
probably should be out for some time. One must be careful not to 
judge an intellectual shift of these dimensions too quickly. We are not 
talking about trends that display their full effects in a year or two, or 
perhaps even in a generation. And the general character of legal 
scholarship is not static, but rather evolving. It is my sense, for exam-
ple, that newer scholars are putting somewhat greater emphasis in 
thinking about current legal issues than has been true of the middle-
aged scholars, who really ushered in the interdisciplinary movement. 
Overall, though, my own firm belief is that law schools today are 
institutions of high integrity. By that I do not mean only that law 
professors, and students, work hard. Nor do I mean to say that law 
schools as they are presently composed are necessary to an intelligent 
and humane system of law. Indeed, they seem to me singular social 
institutions. Society surely could train lawyers far more efficiently 
than the law schools do. But we do something quite special. We take 
virtually all of the potential entrants into the profession, before they 
have done anything in law, before they have built up the kind of local 
knowledge - what this judge is likely to do with that case, and so 
forth - that tends to inhibit broad and idealistic thinking, and at the 
very outset of their careers, when everything seems to have a kind of 
magical aura, we introduce them to a wide body of knowledge about 
law, resisting specialization; provide them with a base in the structures 
of thought central to law; have them participate with very talented and 
broad-minded people in approaching problem after problem after 
problem in an special, independent atmosphere of critical inquiry; and 
do all this in a setting suffused with a profound respect for the human 
achievement of law. It is a rich, and I also think wise, culture that 
operates in this fashion. It may make, or contribute, to making law as 
central as it is to life in this society; but, given that law is that central, 
it is certainly wise social policy to educate our lawyers in this way. 
By integrity, then, I mean to say that the people involved - the 
faculties - are personally committed to the kind of enterprise I have 
just described. They work hard at achieving the aims of the institution 
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as it is defined. Faculty prepare for classes, and their fatigue after-
wards bespeaks their engagement. Faculty grade their students' exam-
inations. 3 Faculty do research and writing, and do it themselves. 
They are there at the birth of their articles and books. And, most 
significantly, virtually all faculty, even the few who can be fairly de-
scribed as purely "theoretical" - indeed, especially those faculty -
have a profound identification with the institution of law in the 
society. 
I think our most serious problem in modem legal education - and 
here I am referring to the teaching and not the research function - is, 
ironically, that it is not "theoretical" enough. The source of the prob-
lem is the continued dominance of the casebook as the primary form 
of educational material in law schools. For all of the efforts to draw 
upon the knowledge of related disciplines, legal scholarship has bene-
fited from these efforts substantially more than legal education has 
been enhanced. I do not mean to say that the interdisciplinary move-
ment has left the classroom experience untouched. There are many 
courses in today's law school curriculum that introduce the students 
to other fields of knowledge. The number of courses entitled "law and 
... " testifies convincingly to that. Nevertheless, the basic courses 
within the first year oflaw school and the so- called core courses of the 
second and third years continue, in my judgment, still to be organized 
around the casebook method, which relies on the appellate court opin-
ion as the principal focus of instruction. It is as if law schools are 
stuck between the Langdellian revolution of the late nineteenth cen-
tury and the interdisciplinary revolution of the late twentieth century. 
Every law school struggles in one way or another with this funda-
mental problem. Deans set up special task forces on curriculum re-
form, which produce extensive reports the gist of which is that we do 
not sufficiently integrate the knowledge we have about law into the 
appellate-court-opinion-dominated curriculum, and the reports are 
followed by many meetings and much debate, at the conclusion of 
which very little is done. It is a curious feature of contemporary legal 
education that the first year of law school is still so heavily organized 
around doctrinal analysis of classic cases in the basic areas of con-
tracts, property, torts, criminal law, and civil procedure. There is too 
often an implicit, if not an explicit, message conveyed to most students 
that what they bring with them from their earlier education, which is 
usually the stuff of the interdisciplinary work in law, is not fully rele-
vant to the study and practice of law. The cases contain little direct 
3. I refer to this practice not for its intrinsic value but as an example of the intimate engage-
ment of faculty in the teaching enterprise. 
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reference to other fields. Though the notes after the cases do fre-
quently try to draw upon interdisciplinary knowledge, as do many 
teachers during class time, the primary focus, day after day, is the next 
set of legal doctrines and the development of the skill of critical analy-
sis and effective advocacy. 
Students learn quickly that any effort to develop a sophisticated 
grasp of related fields will not be rewarded on the examination, where 
spotting issues in a hypothetical case and writing a memorandum of 
law outlining the issues and stating the conclusion or advice remains 
the primary method by which we grade students. The standard upper-
class courses on the whole do not vary significantly from this model. 
Coverage of doctrine and fields of law is the predominant classroom 
activity. 
The fundamental problem facing modem law schools, therefore, is 
precisely how to combine the coverage of doctrine and the develop-
ment of skills of critical and careful reasoning, with the integration of 
the extensive and growing knowledge of related fields that have come 
to inform so much of the scholarship emanating from the academy, 
and the role law plays beyond the appellate court. Despite the some-
what popular view, represented in Judge Edwards' article, about the 
nondoctrinal character of the average law school class, the situation is 
actually quite the reverse. 
But, that said, I remain convinced that law schools are institutions 
of integrity, as I have defined that standard. Perhaps the best test of 
this would be to ask those practitioners who have recently visited and 
taught in major law schools what they think about the state of our 
institutions. Over the years I have invited several leading practicing 
lawyers to teach at Michigan. I believe that every one of them would 
say, even in private, that the present health oflaw schools is very high, 
that students are being well-served, that in all that is done there is a 
seriousness of purpose and a public spiritedness that is highly 
admirable. 
I want to conclude with both an acknowledgment and some diffi-
cult observations, which are not offered and I hope are not taken in the 
spirit of retaliation. I would agree with Judge Edwards that there is 
less in today's legal scholarship offering help to judges disposing of 
cases on their dockets than in earlier generations. I have cautioned 
against overstating this decline and have disagreed with a number of 
conclusions Judge Edwards draws from it about the character of law 
schools. I also think that probably much of what he might call "the-
ory" I would say can, in fact, be helpful to judges. Holmes was right, 
in my view, when he said there is nothing more practical than a good 
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theory. But the lessening of dialogue between the legal academic 
world and the judiciary is nonetheless a reality, and, at least in part, an 
unfortunate one. One cause, no doubt, is the shift in legal scholarship 
to which Judge Edwards points. 
But, to my mind, a greater part is due to another change, and that 
concerns the nature of judging in this society. The fact, in other 
words, that legal scholarship is directed less to judges and more to 
other audiences is the result not only of changes in the composition of 
legal scholars and of new and important intellectual commitments, as 
I have suggested, but also of changes within the judiciary that make it 
a less appealing audience. 
In recent years the judiciary has been a beleaguered institution. 
The decline in judicial salaries relative to those in the academy and the 
practicing bar; the increase in the politicization of the appointments 
process during the 1980s - especially by the effort to pack the judici-
ary with young judges of a particular ideological bent; the enormous 
increase in the workload of judges and the increase in the amount of 
tedious issues; the reported decline of collegiality among judges on the 
same court; the lessening of personal engagement of judges with the 
creative side of the office, manifested primarily in the growing reliance 
on law clerks to write opinions - or first drafts of opinions - and 
other similar forms of bureaucratization; and, finally, the trend within 
the judiciary away from the judicial activism of the Warren Court era. 
These changes in all candor make the judiciary a less interesting sub-
ject for legal scholarship; all the changes have weakened the interest of 
those in the academy in thinking about what judges are doing and in 
engaging judges in dialogue. 
Part of the growing gap between the judges and the professors, in 
other words, is the product of a perceived decline in the intellectual 
interest of judging and of a declining sense of identification with the 
position of judge within the society. Law professors used to identify 
more closely with the life of a judge, especially a federal judge. When 
I began teaching in the early 1970s, the aspiration of many law profes-
sors was to be a judge on a federal court of appeals. Indeed, the salary 
of a senior law professor was pegged to that of a court of appeals 
judge, symbolically indicating the sense of shared identity and mission 
within the life of the law. Today the feelings within law schools are 
considerably different. While few faculty would turn down a judicial 
position if offered, very few would accept without ambivalence, with-
out a sense of loss over how this once would have felt like a crowning 
professional achievement but does no more. 
From a scholarly point of view, this means that there is less inter-
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est in following and responding to the writings coming out of the 
courts. More accurately, scholarly engagement with judicial work is 
more likely to take the perspective of detached and strong criticism, 
instead of reflecting a sense of shared mission with judges. Judges 
seem less reachable, as well as less interesting. There are, of course, 
and everyone knows this, exceptions among judges (notably Judge Ed-
wards). But it is the general sense of what judges and the judicial 
process are like that determines the general character of legal 
scholarship. 
What this means, then, is that at the very same time that there has 
been an intellectual explosion about what is truly relevant to thinking 
about law, there has been a decline, or perceived decline, of intellec-
tual interest in what judges do. While in law schools law seems richer 
and more complex, in the courts law has become more mundane, more 
quotidian, more like the dull products of the administrative agency 
system. Judges themselves bear some of the responsibility for this 
state of affairs, though surely not all of it. I sense that, especially with 
the tendency exhibited over the past decades to give a high priority to 
prior judicial experience in making appointments to the bench, that we 
are heading towards a professionalized judiciary, similar in character 
to the bench in the civil law systems. That, I must say, does not bode 
well for the wish to reestablish closer intellectual ties between the 
academy and the judiciary. Nor does it bode well for society. 
